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KENTUCKY LAW Jou AL
punishment. The criminal punishment is not exclusive and a civil action may be
maintained. It seems that this civil action can be maintained by third persons.
Notice is necessary if the suit is brought by another child but may not be neces-
sary if the action is brought by third persons. Future support should be allowed
to prevent multiplicity of actions and should be similar to a decree for alimony.
GERALD ROBIN GRIFFIN
KENTUCKY'S OBSOLETE LAW ON GIFTS BY DEBTORS
The Statute of Elizabeth,' progenitor of most modem statutes and case law
concerning conveyances deemed fraudulent as to creditors, declared broadly that
every conveyance and gift made with the "intent to delay, hinder or defraud
creditors and others is void." Thus the sole criterion for declaring a conveyance
within the operation of the statute was whether there was an intent on the part
of the grantor to delay or defraud his creditors. Literally interpreted, the statute
makes of no consequence the fact that a conveyance would have the effect of
delaying or defrauding a creditor unless there is also present the requisite intent.
Nevertheless the courts have uniformly held that a gift, or a voluntary conveyance
without consideration, made while the financial position of the debtor is such
that the payment of creditors is necessarily defeated, as where the debtor is in-
solvent or is rendered thereby insolvent, is fraudulent as a matter of law without
regard to actual intent of the debtor.' From a practical standpoint there can be
no quarrel with this holding. An irresponsible person should not be permitted to
dissipate completely his assets by gifts leaving his creditors without any assets on
which to realize their claims.
A more difficult problem is what effect mere indebtedness without near in-
solvency of the donor should have upon the validity of a gift as against con-
temporaneous creditors. Two views have been developed by courts interpreting
theStatute of Elizabeth or its successors as to this problem. The holdings are
that the voluntary conveyance (1) is presumed to be fraudulent with respect to
the existing debt and no circumstance will suffice to repel the legal presumption
of fraud,' and (2) is merely prima facie fraudulent3
As early as 1836, Kentucky laid down without reservation the rule that
voluntary conveyances were conclusively fraudulent as to antecedent creditors
and the court has followed it undeviatingly until the present time.' In Hanson v.
Buckners Devisees,' the first case holding squarely on this point, the court said:
"And the presumption of law as to prior debts, does not
depend upon the amount of the debts, the intentions, or circumstances
of the party conveying, or the amount of property conveyed. The law
'3 ELiz., c. 5 (1540).
Although there were earlier statutes for the protection of creditors such as
50 Enw. III, c. 6 (1376) and 3 HEN. VII, c. 4 (1488), the statute of 13 ELiz. is
the starting point for most discussions of fradulent conveyances.
I GLENN, THE LA-W OF FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE-S sec. 269 (1940).
4 GLENN, OP. cit. supra, note 3, at sec. 268.
'GLENN, OP. cit. supra, note 3; 37 C. J. S. 935, 936.
' Damels v. Goff, 192 Ky. 15, 232 S.W 66 (1921); Townsend v. Wilson, 114
Ky. 504, 24 Ky. L. Rep. 1276, 7-1 S.W 440 (1903); Miller v. Desha, 66 Ky.
(3 Bush) 212 (1867); Trimble v. Ratcliff, 48 Ky. (9 B. Mon.) 511 (1849). The
paucity of recent cases on this point is further evidence of the rigidity of this rule.
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will not permit an inquiry to be made into these matters, or give to
them any weight or influence. The law, has wisely cut off
all enquiry (sic) and treated all voluntary conveyances and settle-
ments founded upon no other consideration than that of natural affec-
tion or blood, as nullities, whenever they stand in the way of pre-
existent debts."'
Earlier Kentucky cases' and statutes"° could have been cited in support of
this holding, but the court chose to rely mainly on the decision of Chancellor Kent
in Reade v. Livingston." It was in this famous case that Kent came to the con-
clusion that the fair deduction from the cases is that the Statute of 13 Elizabeth,
which requires intent to delay, hinder, or defraud, should be interpreted to mean
that if "the party be indebted at the time of the voluntary settlement, it is pre-
sumed to be fraudulent in respect to such debts, and no circumstances will permit
those debts to be affected by the settlement, or repel the legal presumption of
fraud.""-1 In other words, fraudulent intent of the debtor is presumed as to exasting
creditors when any gifts are made by him. This interpretation of the statute was
made notwithstanding the obvious fact that the intent of the parties is no more
subject to inquiry under the statute when the conveyance is made to defraud
subsequent creditors than-when it is made to defraud antecedent creditors.
It was this Kent doctrine which was codified and embodied into the Ky.
Rev. Stat. sec. 378.020 (1948) which provides that:
"Every gift, conveyance, assignment, transfer or charge
made by a debtor, of or upon any of his estate without valuable con-
sideration therefor, shall be void as to all his then existing creditors,
but shall not, on that account alone, be void as to creditors whose
claims are thereafter contracted, nor as to purchasers from the debtor
with notice of the voluntary alienation or charge."
This statute is open to the common sense objection of imputing a fraudulent
intent, under circumstances repelling all possible imagination of fraud and in-
vading the lawful domimon which a man should have over is own property while
acting in good faith. If earned to its ultimate consequences even the most trivial
indebtedness would be sufficient to avoid the voluntary conveyance. The easy
credit and installment buying, which has descended upon us within the last gen-
eration, has made the unindebted person a rarity. With this premise it would
perforce follow that not one donee could feel secure in the enjoyment of us
bounty. Chief Justice Marshall expressed his fear of this outcome in Hopkzrk v.
Randolph by declaring, " a construction which should, under all circumstances,
comprehend every gift (fraudulent), merely because it was voluntary, might
derange the ordinary course of society, and produce much greater injustice than
it would prevent."
S34 Ky. (4 Dana) 251, 29 Am. Dec. 401 (1836).
'Id. at 254, 29 Am. Dec. at 404.
'Lyne, etc. v. Bank of Kentucky, 28 Ky. (5 J. J. Marsh) 545 (1831); see
Cosby, etc. v. Ross Admr, 26 Ky. (3 J. J. Marsh) 290 (1830).
1I STAT. LAw oF Ky. (Littell, 1809) 871, approved Dec. 14, 1796.
13 Johns. Ch. Rep. (N. Y.) 481, 8 Am. Dec. 520 (1818).
Id. at 500, 8 Am. Dec. at 532.
The word "void" as used in this statute and the statute of 13 ELIz. has been
construed to mean "voidable," and "voidable" only at the instance and option of
those who are witin the purview of the statutes. 24 Am. Jun. 261.
" 12 Fed. Cas. 513, 515, No. 6, 698 (C.C.E.D. Va. 1824).
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It was only a short time after Kent laid down his doctrine that New York
realized its harshness and overniled his decision in Jackson v. Seward.1 In this
case the court was constrained to hold from its review of the cases that a voluntary
conveyance by one indebted at the time, was only prima facie, and not conclusive,
evidence of fraud. This decision was later followed by a statute."6  Most of the
states by now have accepted this more rational view, and they impute conclusive
fraud only when the donor is insolvent. 7
Other courts, unable wholly to discard the rule, strained to remove them-
selves from under its full impact by limiting it in whatever way possible. The
amount of indebtedness and the amount of the gift necessary to bring the rule
into effect were increased. Thus where the indebtedness is slight, as for the
current expenses of the family, or the debts are inconsiderable as compared with
the value of the donor s estate, the conveyance has been held valid." Still other
jurisdictions limited its application by declaring that a person holding mere con-
tingent claims which would not mature until after the gift was not to be con-
sidered a preexisting creditor and hence not in a position to bring the rule into
effect." Kentucky, however, has expresslv refused to go along with this latter
holding.'
With a view toward remedying this obsolete doctrine, Kentucky should take
notice that New Jersey which was labeled the "modern stronghold"' for the
Kent rule, was one of the first to enact the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act.
The pertinent section of this Act relating to voluntary conveyances by debtors
provides:
"Every conveyance made and every obligation incurred
by a person who is or will be thereby rendered insolvent is fraudulent
as to creditors without regard to his actual intent if the conveyance
is made or the obligation is incurred without a fair consideration.""-
Although this section does not in express words repeal the holding that all
voluntary conveyances are fradulent at law with respect to antecedent creditors,
it may well be argued that it is so inconsistent therewith that the two should not
be permitted to coexist.' The wording of the Uniform Act seems to indicate that
the test for the imputation of conclusive fraud on a debtor is not mere indebted-
ness as provided in Kentucky s statute, but rather insolvency. However, even
after the passage of that act, the New Jersey courts had difficulty in overcoming
"8 Cow. 406 (N. Y. 1826).
" N. Y. REv. STAT. (1829) pt. II, c. 7, tit. 3. This statute went to the opposite
extreme by declaring that the determination of what is a fraudulent conveyance
was always a question of fact.
" See note 5 supra.
VBuchanan v. McNinch, 3 Rich 498 (S. C. 1872); Hindes Lessee v. Long-
worth, 11 Wheat 198 (U. S. 1826), see Tnnble v. Rateliff, 48 Ky. (9 B. Mon)
511, 514 (1849).
"Severs v. Dodson, 53 N. J. Eq. 683, 34 A. 7 (1895).
Danels v. Goff, 192 Ky. 15, 20, 232 S.W 66, 68 (1921) where the court
said in reference to the wording of Ky. REv. STAT. see. 378.020 (1948), "The
word 'liabilities includes debts and indebtedness; but it is broader, and includes
in addition existing obligations, which may or may not in the future eventuate in
an indebtedness."
"McLaughlin, The Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, 46 HAiIv. L. REv.
404, 408 (1933).
- Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, sec. 4, 9 U. L. A.
"McLaughlin, supra, note 21, at 408.
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the inertia that had kept the doctrine of Reade v. Livingston alive through the
years. It was followed for nearly ten years before it was corrected in Conway v.
Raphael.' In view of the reluctance which the courts of that state displayed in
breaking away from the established rule, case-hardened through the years, even
after the passage of the Uniform Act, it is inconceivable that Kentucky could
change its equally well established rule by any means other than by statute.
Kentucky should therefore enact the pertinent section of the Uniform Act
set out above. In addition Ky. Rev. Stat. sec. 378.020 (1948) should be modi-
fied so as to eliminate the inconsistency which arises from that statute as it now
stands and the Uniform Act. This is the same inconsistency which New Jersey
encountered. It can be removed by the substitution of the words "prima facie
fraudulent" for the word "void" in the present statute. With this minor change
the statute would read:
"Every gift, conveyance, assignment, transfer or charge
made by a debtor, of or upon any of his estate without valuable con-
sideration therefor, shall be (void) prima facie fraudulent as to is
then existing creditors, but shall not, on that account alone, be (void)
prima face fraudulent as to creditors whose claims are thereafter
contracted, nor as to purchasers from the debtor with notice of the
voluntary alienation or charge." (Proposed additions in italics; pres-
ent wording in brackets).
This change would incorporate into statutory form the prevailing judicial
treatment of voluntary conveyances by solvent debtors. If this section were com-
pletely repealed the case law holding that gifts bv debtors were fraudulent as to
preexisting creditors might continue to exist. This would result in placing Ken-
tucky in the same position as New Jersey immediately after it passed the Uniform
Act. Therefore this section, as changed would require the courts of this state
forthwith to sever themselves from the old line of decisions and thereby eliminate
the possibility of an interim period, such as the one New Jersey endured, from
the time of the passage of the Uniform Act unltil it becomes completely effective.
The enactment of these proposed statutes would remove the stigma of a
doctrine early placed in Kentucky s laws by the blind following of the weighty
name of Chancellor Kent, and which rests on no more than the highly dubious
rationale "that a person must be just before he is- generous."-
JAMES M. MARKS
- 102 N. J. Eq. 531, 141 Adt. 804 (1928).
'Thomas v. Aldridge, 241 Ky. 1, 43 S.W 2d 179 (1931); Lyne v. Bank of
Kentucky, 28 Ky. (5 J. J. Marsh) 545, 553, 554 (1831).
